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HOW EFFICIENT MARKETS UNDERVALUE
STOCKS: CAPM AND ECMH UNDER
CONDITIONS OF UNCERTAINTY AND
DISAGREEMENT
Lynn A. Stout*
In 1988, the Wall Street Journalbegan a contest.' Periodically,
the Journal staff would invite four professional money managers to
select the stocks they thought would do best in the coming months.
Then the staff would repair to a nearby tavern, pin a page from the
stock quotes section to the wall, and throw darts to select their own
portfolio. At the end of each contest period, the Journal would
announce who had done better, the pros or the darts. In the first
round, the hands-down winner of this "Investment Dartboard"
contest was: the darts.2
This result came as no surprise to either finance theorists or
their hangers-on.' After all, we had all studied from that bible of
modern financial theory, Brealey and Myers' Principles of Corporate Finance.4 We knew that decades of scholarship had definitively proven the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH), a
keystone theory of modem finance that predicts that market prices
are "informationally efficient" (i.e., respond to new information alWe also knew about the Capital Asset
most instantaneously).'
Pricing Model (CAPM), a second fundamental tenet of finance
that holds that rational investors value stocks according only to
their expected return and nondiversifiable risk.6 Taken together,
the ECMH and CAPM seemed to teach that prices set by an efficient market reflect the best possible estimates of stocks' future
risks and returns, with the logical implication that any attempt to
*

Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.

1 See John R. Dorfman, Investment Dartboard: Pros Gamely Go up Against 'Dartboard', WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1988, at C1.

John R. Dorfman, Investment Dartboard: Random Stock Picks Give Pros the Woes,
J., Nov. 4, 1988, at C1 (reporting that in the first month of the contest, the
dartboard portfolio had risen 0.7% while the pros' choices declined an average of 2.5%).
3 I fit myself into this second category, along with many other corporate and securities
scholars.
4 RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
(5th ed. 1996).
5 See generally id. at 336-37.
6 See generally id. at 143-65.
2
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identify underpriced or overpriced stocks was doomed to failure.7
Thus the Investment Dartboard results only confirmed what the
academics already knew: you can't beat the market.8
Or so it seemed from the first round. Undeterred by their initial defeat, investment managers continued to step up to the plate
in subsequent Investment Dartboard contests. And as the contest
continued, it soon became apparent that while the pros sometimes
lost, more often they won. The Journalhas now run the Investment
Dartboard contest for over eight years, and over that time a clear
pattern has emerged: although the darts frequently give the pros a
drubbing, on average the pros are beating both the darts and the
market. Indeed, as of October 1996, the pros' portfolios had produced average annual gains of 20.6%, compared to 11.2% for the
darts, and 11.6% for the Dow Jones Industrial Average.9
What can explain this peculiar (to academics) result?' ° One
possibility is that the Investment Dartboard contest offers a striking illustration of the so-called "hot hands" effect. Extensive empirical evidence supports the claim that fund managers who
actively trade stocks tend, on average, to underperform the market.11 Yet the evidence also suggests that those few managers who
do beat the market-the winning traders with hot hands-have a2
statistically greater chance of doing so again in the next period.'
In other words, although most fund managers don't beat the market's return, those who do seem to be able to beat it with some
7 As Professors Brealey and Myers put it, efficient market theory teaches that investors should "trust market prices," because "in an efficient market there is no way for most
investors to achieve consistently superior rates of return." Id. at 336-37. An exception to
this general rule may exist for investors who have access to proprietary corporate information. There is some evidence that stock prices do not fully reflect such "inside" information. See generally id. at 295. However, there seems to be little to suggest that Berkshire
Hathaway's success can be attributed to insider information.
8 1 suspect one reason why academics have found this result so attractive is that it gives
us a quick comeback to that annoying question, "If you're so smart, why aren't you rich?"
9 See Georgette Jasen, Investment Dartboard:Luck Out: Stock Experts Top the Darts,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1996, at Cl (reporting that during eight years of contest, pros' portfolios produced average six-month gains of 10.3%, compared to 5.6% for dart portfolio and
5.8% for the Dow Jones Industrial Average).
10 Although I am unaware of any attempt to test the Investment Dartboard contest
results for statistical significance, the pros' success has been quite marked and has persisted
over a period of several years.
11 Edwin J. Elton, et al., The Persistenceof Risk-Adjusted Mutual Fund Performance,69
J. Bus. 133 (1996). This result is obvious once one realizes that the secondary stock market
is largely composed of such traders, and that trading involves transactions costs.
12 See id. at 135 (surveying literature). See also, e.g., Darryll Hendricks, et al., Hot
Hands in Mutual Funds: Short Run Persistence of Relative Performance, 1974-1988, 48 J.
FIN. 93 (1993).
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consistency. Under the rules of the Investment Dartboard contest,
the two pros whose stock picks do best in each period are invited
back for another round against the darts. 13 Winners continue to
rules favor the
play, while losers exit the game. Thus, the contest
4
traders.1
hands
hot
of
participation
continued
The hot hands phenomenon poses a serious challenge to conventional finance. Because stocks are volatile instruments, it
should come as no surprise that some managed portfolios outperform the overall market during a particular period while other
portfolios lag behind. Yet, according to the ECMH/CAPM, the
identity of the winners and losers should be a matter of random
luck. The idea that a small number of hot hands traders can consistently identify and profit from mispriced securities shakes the
very foundations of the efficient markets claim that "the market
knows best."
Two of the hottest pairs of hands around, of course, belong to
Warren Buffett and his partner, Charlie Munger. Over a period of
decades, these two individuals have demonstrated consistently su15
perior performance in picking stocks for Berkshire Hathaway.
As a result, their very existence has become something of an embarrassment to a generation of finance theorists and corporate
scholars. Messrs. Buffett and Munger not only say they can beat
the market: they do. What are we academics to make of them?
POSTMODERN FINANCIAL THEORY

If we can't beat them in proving that they can't beat the market, perhaps we should give some thought to joining them. In this
vein, recent years have seen the rise of a new generation of finan13 See Jasen, supra note 9, at C1.
14 Other possible explanations exist as well. For example, Professor Burton Malkiel
has suggested that the publicity surrounding the Investment Dartboard contest may produce short-term gains for the stocks recommended by the pros. See Dorfman, supra note
1, at C1. However, using the conventional ECMH/CAPM approach, it is difficult to see
why publicity alone should affect a stock's price, if an efficient market has already priced it
accurately. See infra text accompanying note 36 (discussing publicity and prices of neglected firms). Another possibility is that the stocks selected by the pros carry a higher
degree of nondiversifiable (or beta) risk than the market as a whole, and so offer higher
returns to compensate for that risk. See infra note 23 (discussing relationship between beta
risk and return under CAPM). However, I am unaware of any evidence that would support the claim that the pro's portfolios carry higher betas than the market. See also infra
text accompanying notes 40-42 (discussing empirical evidence that, contrary to CAPM,
stocks with high levels of beta risk may not offer higher returns).
15 See Roger Lowenstein, Modern-day Midas, Bus. TIMES, Mar. 9,1996, at 2 (reporting
that over the past four decades Warren Buffett has earned annual gains of 28.6%, while
major stock averages have enjoyed annual gains of about 10%).
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cial theorists and securities scholars who take "modern" finance
theory d la Brealey and Myers with a very large portion of salt.
These "postmodern"' 16 scholars have produced a number of theoretical alternatives to the standard ECMH/CAPM that support
what Buffett, Munger, and others who make their livings in the
market have been telling us all along: contrary to the central tenets
of modern finance theory, market price does not necessarily reflect
the best estimate of a stock's value.
Scholars willing to explore the brave new world of postmodern
finance will find an expanding literature that offers at least three
exciting new avenues of investigation. One is so-called "noise trading" theory. Noise theorists postulate that a substantial portion of
traders in the market are irrational, in the sense that they suffer
testable cognitive biases that impede their collective ability to
coldly calculate the intrinsic value of securities. Because noise
traders act on psychological impulse ("noise") rather than true information, their trading tends to drive stock prices away from best
estimates of fundamental values, creating opportunities for rational
17
traders to identify underpriced and overpriced securities.
A second important branch of the new literature has been
dubbed "chaos" (or, sometimes, "rational bubble" or "sunspot")
theory. Chaos finance explores scenarios where a small deviation
of an asset's market price from its intrinsic value may be magnified
through self-reinforcing cascade effects into wild and fundamentally unjustified price swings. 18 Thus, like noise theory, chaos finance also suggests that efficient market prices sometimes fail to
reflect best estimates of value.
16 1 owe this appellation to Professor Lawrence A. Cunningham. See Lawrence A.
Cunningham, Editor, Conversationsfrom the Warren Buffett Symposium, 19 CARDOZO L.
REV. 719, 776 (1997) [hereinafter Buffett Conversations].
17 See generally Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J.FIN. 529, 529-34 (1986); J. Bradford De
Long, et al., The Size and Incidence of the Losses from Noise Trading,44 J. FIN. 681 (1989);
J. Bradford De Long, et al., Noise Trader Risk in FinancialMarkets, 98 J. POL. ECON. 703

(1990); Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance,
J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1990, at 19.
Although the noise trading model suggests that rational traders earn profits at the
expense of noise traders, noise trading will nevertheless persist either if there is an outside
supply of new noise traders, or if noise traders are less risk-averse than rational traders and
so can earn superior returns by accepting risk. See generally J. Bradford De Long et al.,
The Survival of Noise Traders in FinancialMarkets, 64 J. Bus. 1 (1991).

18 See, e.g., M.C. Adam & A. Szafarz, Speculative Bubbles and FinancialMarkets, 44
OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 626 (1992) (surveying literature); WILLIAM A. BARNETT ET AL.,
ECONOMIC COMPLEXITY: CHAOS, SUNSPOTS, BUBBLES, AND NONLINEARITY (1989); Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of
the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546 (1994).
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I believe noise theory and chaos finance both have much to
offer scholars seeking to explain otherwise puzzling market phenomena. I would like to focus my discussion, however, on a third
promising avenue of research I shall refer to as the "heterogeneous
expectations" approach. I want to concentrate on heterogeneous
expectations for three reasons. First, while the latest generation of
finance theorists has paid substantial attention to the heterogeneous expectations approach, legal scholars have largely neglected it.
I thus perceive an attractive opportunity to engage in what Professor Bratton has dubbed "academic arbitrage." 19
My second reason for focusing on the heterogeneous expectations approach is my sense that, for many legal scholars, heterogenous expectations models may provide an especially gentle
introduction to the sometimes cold and forbidding waters of
postmodern finance. In a sense, the heterogeneous expectation approach is simply an elaboration or extension of the standard
ECMH/CAPM story.20 Corporate scholars raised on Brealey and
Myers thus may find it easier to digest than either noise theory or
chaos finance.
My third reason for choosing to concentrate my discussion on
the heterogeneous expectations approach is my belief that, despite
its relative simplicity, the heterogeneous expectations approach to
finance is an extremely powerful predictor of market behavior. As
the discussion below suggests, a model of stock prices premised on
investor disagreement goes a long way towards solving a number of
important empirical puzzles that have plagued scholars who rely on
the conventional ECMH/CAPM.2 1 That observation alone sug19 See Buffett Conversations,supra note 16, at 788.
20 Indeed, the heterogeneous expectations approach can be thought of as a necessary

intermediate step between the oversimplified theoretical world of ECMH/CAPM and the
complex and difficult realities of noise and chaos theory. Conventional ECMH/CAPM
looks at the relationship between risky asset prices and fundamental values when all investors share homogeneous expectations for the future. See infra text accompanying notes 2223 (homogeneity). The heterogeneous expectations approach adds a degree of complexity
by assuming that investors' expectations may differ. See infra text accompanying notes 2528 (implications of heterogeneity). Noise theory takes another step to explore irrational
sources of disagreement, while chaos theory examines the feedback implications of disagreement (whether rational or irrational) for price stability.
21 See Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair
Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235 (1990) [hereinafter Stout, Takeover Premiums] (discussing how a heterogeneous expectations approach may offer insights into the
source of takeover premiums and the relationship between stock prices and fundamental
values); Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure,
and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611 (1995) (discussing how heterogeneous expectations may explain investor trading behavior and the value of mandatory disclosure);
Lynn A. Stout, Betting The Bank: How Derivatives Trading Under Conditions of Uncer-
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gests that academics who wish to understand the market would do
well to acquaint themselves with the heterogeneous expectations
approach to finance.
HOMOGENEITY AND DISAGREEMENT

The heterogeneous expectations approach to finance begins
with the assumption that people trying to predict an inherently uncertain future may have differing views about particular securities'
likely risks and returns. In other words, people disagree. To the
average person on the street-or average trader on the Street-the
notion that people disagree may seem obvious. Yet the idea'of disagreement turns out to be completely inconsistent with the conventional ECMH/CAPM.
Although the CAPM is one of the most important tools of
modern finance, the theorem suffers from the following peculiarity:
it assumes that all traders in the market make identical estimates of
the risks and returns associated with particular securities. This
assumption is readily apparent from a quick perusal of the original
work of such pioneers as John Lintner and William Sharpe. Each
begins with the express assumption of homogeneous
expectations.22
Recognizing that the standard CAPM assumes homogeneous
expectations suggests that corporate scholars who use CAPM to
predict that market prices accurately reflect a stock's intrinsic values are, in fact, relying on a tautology. After all, if all people share
the same estimate of a stock's intrinsic worth, why wouldn't market
tainty Can Increase Risks and Erode Returns in FinancialMarkets, 21 J. CORP. L. 53 (1995)

(discussing insights of heterogeneous expectations approach for derivatives trading) [hereinafter Stout, Betting The Bank]; Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Derivatives, Difference Contracts, and the Social Value of Antispeculation Laws (unpublished
manuscript on file with author) (explaining how the heterogeneous expectations approach
supports legal hostility towards speculators, including a possible explanation for speculative bubbles).
22 See John Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments
in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 REV. ECON. & STAT. 13, 14 (1965); William F.
Sharpe, CapitalAsset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk,

19 J. FIN. 425, 427 (1964).
Both Sharpe and Lintner subsequently produced work considering the effects of heterogeneity. See WILLIAM F. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL MARKETS 104-13
(1970) [hereinafter PORTFOLIO THEORY]; John Lintner, The Aggregation of Investor's Diverse Judgments and Preferences in Purely Competitive Securities Markets, 4 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 347 (1969) [hereinafter Diverse Judgements]. Jack Treynor is a
third economist often credited with developing the CAPM, although his article on the subject is not published. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 4, at 180 n.9. Treynor's recent work

also considers the role of heterogeneous expectations in markets. See, e.g., Jack Treynor,
Bulls, Bears and Market Bubbles (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
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price reflect that consensus? The CAPM can still be quite useful
for some tasks, such as describing a rational investor's attitude toward risks and returns.23 But as a justification for claiming that
you can't beat the market, its reasoning is circular.
It is probably safe to say at this point that any finance theorist
worth her salt now recognizes that the CAPM is a tautology.
(Although this knowledge is filtering down to the legal community
far more slowly, an increasing number of corporate scholars seem
to recognize this as well.) 2 1 Indeed, a substantial body of work in
finance now focuses on the problem of how asset prices are set in a
world where people disagree, and offers a variety of models examining asset prices under conditions of heterogeneity.2 5 These models differ in many respects, and each has its own advantages. For
the purposes of suggesting the potential of the heterogeneous expectations approach, however, I would like to confine my discussion to a relatively simple yet powerful model based on three
23 Among finance theorists, the term "risk" refers to fluctuations or variations in returns, including both unusual gains and unusual losses. The CAPM presumes that some
sources of variation in firms' earnings are unique to individual firms, and that investors can
eliminate such firm-specific (or alpha) risk simply by holding a diversified portfolio of
many different stocks whose individual ups and downs cancel each other out. Other kinds
of risk tend to affect all firms to a greater or lesser extent: for example, in an economic
recession, everyone's business tends to suffer. Because such market (or beta) risk cannot
be diversified away, risk-averse investors should demand a risk premium in the form of
higher expected returns before they will be willing to hold stocks with a high degree of beta
risk. Indeed, the CAPM predicts that the relationship between beta risk and returns should
be linear: a stock with twice the market's level of beta risk must offer twice the market's
expected return. Firms that have a high degree of alpha risk need not offer higher returns,
however, because alpha risk can be diversified away. See generally BREALEY & MYERS,
supra note 4, at 173-83.
24 For example, during the 1980s it was common for legal scholars to assert that we
could rely on an efficient market to price stocks accurately, and to formulate policies based
on that claim. It is my sense that this kind of argument has quietly disappeared from law
journals in recent years.
25 See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, Discounts and Other Mysteries of CorporateFinance, 79
CAL. L. REV. 1053 (1991); Diverse Judgments, supra note 22; Robert Jarrow, Heterogeneous Expectations, Restrictions on Short Sales, and Equilibrium Asset Prices, 35 J. FIN. 1105
(1980); Mordecai Kurz, Asset Prices with Rational Beliefs (Monograph No. 375, Center for
Economic Policy Research, Stanford University) (Feb. 1994); Joram Mayshar, On Divergence of Opinion and Imperfections in Capital Markets, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 114 (1983);
Edward R. Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion, 32 J. FIN. 1151 (1977);
PORTFOLIO THEORY, supra note 22, at 104-13; Stout, Takeover Premiums, supra note 21;
Treynor, supra note 22; Hal R. Varian, Divergence of Opinion in Complete Markets: A
Note, 40 J. FIN. 309 (1985); Joseph T. Williams, Capital Asset Prices with Heterogeneous
Beliefs, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 219 (1977).
Noise trading models can also be described as disagreement-based models. See supra
notes 17, 20 (citing noise trading literature and discussing its relationship to the heterogeneous expectations approach).
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assumptions: (1) traders are risk averse; (2) they hold heterogeneous expectations; and (3) short selling is restricted.
A

HETEROGENEOUS EXPECTATIONS MODEL OF
DOWNWARD-SLOPING DEMAND

Let us begin with the assumption of disagreement. In a world
where investors make differing predictions of individual stocks'
likely risks and returns, it seems plausible that investors' subjective
expectations will be normally distributed. In other words, investors' expectations for a particular stock will fall somewhere in a
range between the most pessimistic and the most optimistic, with
most investors' beliefs falling near the middle of the two extremes.
Given such a range of disagreement, if a corporation decides
to issue stock, who is likely to buy it? Assuming short sales are
restricted, the obvious answer is: the optimists. Indeed, if investors
were not risk-averse and had unlimited access to wealth, any particular corporation's shares should end up in the hands of that single individual who subjectively values the firm most highly.
In the real world, of course, investors are both risk-averse and
limited in their wealth and ability to borrow. 26 Thus, a super-optimistic but risk-averse investor who buys a large block of stock she
perceives to be grossly underpriced will at some point begin to
worry that she is putting too many of her eggs in one basket. Risk
aversion will lead her to stop purchasing the stock even though she
27
still perceives it to be significantly underpriced.
If the corporation wants to issue a larger quantity of stock
than the most-optimistic investor is willing to buy, what can the
firm do? One possibility is that the firm can get the most-optimistic investor to buy more shares by lowering the issue price. This is
because lowering the price allows the optimist to see the stock as
an even better bargain than it was before, creating a subjective
"risk premium" that the optimist believes compensates her for the
increased diversifiable risk she suffers by increasing her holdings.
Moreover, lowering price should also help the firm sell more shares
by making the stock attractive to other relatively-optimistic investors, investors who also value the stock more highly than its newly26 These two characteristics are closely related: an investor with infinite wealth would
have little concern for risk.
27 By devoting a large portion of her portfolio to one single stock instead of diversifying, an investor exposes herself to a higher level of firm-specific (or alpha) risk. See supra
note 23.
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reduced offering price, even if not so highly as the most-optimistic
investor does.
The above analysis leads to the prediction that, even at a very
high price, a firm can sell a modest quantity of stock to the subset
of investors who hold the most favorable opinions of the firm's
prospects. Lowering the price allows the firm to sell more shares,
however, both by making the stock attractive to more investors,
and by inducing existing shareholders to add to their holdings.
Thus, lowering a stock's price tends to increase the quantity of that
stock investors demand and are willing to hold.
This last result is highly significant because it suggests that-at
least under conditions of disagreement, risk aversion, and short
sales restrictions-the demand curve for any particular company's
shares should be a classic downward-sloping function with price inversely correlated to the quantity of shares demanded.28 Curiously
28

Si

.

S2

P2

D

Q1

Q2

Quantity of Shares Demanded
Heterogeneous investor expectations combined with risk aversion create a downward-sloping demand function for any individual stock (D). If short sales are restricted, the available supply of stock will be fixed in the short run as illustrated by vertical supply function
S 1. If the company issues more shares and increases the supply of stock to S2, equilibrium
market price falls from P1 to P2. Conversely, repurchasing shares or paying dividends increases market price. See infra text accompanying note 49 (discussing buybacks and dividend payouts under conditions of expectations heterogeneity).
There are other events that might affect the market price of the stock even when the
average investor's expectations remain unchanged. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes
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enough, this seemingly-plausible result turns out to be completely
inconsistent with the traditional ECMH/CAPM.
According to conventional theory, in an efficient market all
firms' shares should be accurately priced and no firm should be a
bargain relative to any other. Thus, all stocks are perfect substitutes. Perfect substitutability in turn implies that the demand curve
for any individual stock should be flat: below market price investors are willing to purchase an infinite amount of shares (because
all perceive the stock to be a bargain), while above market price
investors refuse to purchase even a single share (because all perceive the stock as overpriced). Conversely, firms can issue or repurchase even large quantities of shares at the prevailing market
price without exerting any pressure on that price. In economic
terms, the CAPM predicts that demand for individual stocks
'29
should be "perfectly elastic.
The ECMH/CAPM prediction of perfectly elastic demand
raises a number of troubling questions for academics who rely on
conventional finance. As the discussion below suggests, investors
and stock markets often behave in ways that seem difficult, if not
impossible, to reconcile with the notion of perfectly elastic demand. Many otherwise puzzling market phenomena begin to make
sense, however, under a heterogeneous expectations model of
stock pricing. To the scholar willing to move beyond the conventional ECMH/CAPM, and willing to assume that investors disagree
and the demand for individual securities is downward-sloping, a
number of financial mysteries are revealed.
MYSTERY

No. 1:

WHY DON'T INVESTORS FULLY DIVERSIFY?

Conventional finance theory teaches investors to eliminate
firm-specific (or alpha) risk from their portfolios by diversifyingthat is, by buying stocks in many different companies whose individual risks tend to cancel each other out.30 An investor can reduce the impact of changing fuel prices on her portfolio, for
38-42 (discussing how increasing uncertainty regarding the company's future which increases the dispersion of investors' expectations might raise prices); infra text accompanying notes 36-37 (discussing how increasing public awareness of the company which
increases the pool of potential investors might raise prices by shifting the demand curve
outward); infra note 38 (discussing how a listing on the S&P 500 index which induces
purchases by indexed mutual funds might also raise prices by shifting the demand curve
outward).
29 See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 4, at 345-46 (discussing ECMH/CAPM predic-

tion of perfectly elastic demand for stocks).
30 See supra note 23 (discussing alpha risk).
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example, by buying stocks in both oil companies (whose share
prices tend to rise with fuel prices) and airlines (whose stocks tend
to fall when fuel prices rise). Because an efficient market prices all
stocks accurately, such diversification should reduce alpha risk
without sacrificing return. Thus, modern portfolio theory counsels
investors to diversify their investments.
Curiously, many apparently rational investors seem to ignore
this advice by maintaining portfolios that are heavily weighted toward a relatively small number of companies. Warren Buffett and
Charlie Munger provide an archetypal example: they go so far as to
recommend concentration rather than diversification as the best
strategy for investing. 31 To scholars who rely on conventional
ECMH/CAPM, such behavior seems puzzling indeed.32 After all,
isn't the investor who fails to diversify passing up a cost-free opportunity to reduce risk?
Perhaps Buffett, Munger, and other investors who don't diversify simply haven't read Brealey and Myers. However, the heterogeneous expectations model suggests another explanation for their
behavior. Under the conventional, homogeneous expectationsbased version of the ECMH/CAPM, all investors perceive all
stocks as perfect substitutes, and diversification accordingly is assumed not to carry a cost in the form of reduced returns. Under
the heterogeneous expectations approach, however, investors who
disagree with market prices are likely to see some stocks as bargains and others as too pricey. Concentration thus becomes not
only an acceptable but a preferred strategy to the investor who believes that one stock offers a better buy than another.
MYSTERY

No. 2: WHY Do

TARGET COMPANY SHAREHOLDERS

APPEAR TO CAPTURE ALL THE GAINS IN CORPORATE
TAKEOVERS?

A second mystery of corporate finance that has captured many
legal scholars' attention is the phenomenon of large takeover premiums. In a typical corporate acquisition, the bidding company
will pay 25%, 50%, or even 75% over the earlier prevailing market
price for the target's shares.3 3 This pattern seems puzzling, for ac31 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Compilation, The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons
for CorporateAmerica, 19 CARDozo L. REV. 1, 75 (1997) [hereinafter Buffett Essays].
32 See Buffett Conversations, supra note 16, at 787-94 (discussing puzzle).
33 See Stout, Takeover Premiums,supra note 21, at 1235, 1256. While the shareholders

in target firms seem to reap huge gains in takeovers, on average the bidder's share price
usually does not rise or fall significantly. See id. at 1260.
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cording to the ECMH/CAPM, the demand curve for the target
company's stock should be flat. Thus, takeover bidders should be
able to purchase even very large blocks of their targets' stock without paying significant premiums. After all, if investors regard all
stocks as perfect substitutes, target shareholders should be willing
to jump ship even if offered only a dollar over market price.
Legal scholars who rely on the conventional ECMH/CAPM
approach to finance accordingly have tended to regard takeover
premiums as a somewhat striking phenomenon. Indeed, more than
one grove of trees has been sacrificed in the attempt to explain
them. 34 The puzzle of takeover premiums is only a puzzle, however, if the demand curve for a target company's stock is flat. If
the demand curve for the target's stock is downward-sloping, an
easy and elegant explanation for premiums emerges.
When investors disagree and the demand curve for a target's
stock is downward-sloping, the market price for a single share of
the target company will be set by the subjective valuation of the
most pessimistic member of the optimistic subset of investors who
choose to hold shares in that company. A buyer who only wants to
purchase a single share only needs to offer a price sufficient to satisfy this marginal, relatively pessimistic shareholder. A takeover
bidder who wants to purchase a very large number of shares, however, must also be prepared to deal with more optimistic shareholders who value their shares more highly than the marginal
shareholder does. Thus, to acquire a controlling interest-51%,
70%, or even 100%-a takeover bidder must work her way up a
sloping demand
function, paying ever higher prices to acquire
35
more shares.
The heterogeneous expectations model of downward-sloping
demand consequently predicts that any successful takeover bidder
34 See, e.g., Bernard Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597
(1989); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 435; Reinier Kraakman, Taking
Discounts Seriously: The Implicationsof "Discounted"Shares Prices as An Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891 (1988); Dale Arthur Oesterle, Revisiting the Anti-Takeover
Fervor of the '80s Through the Letters of Warren Buffett: Current Acquisition PracticeIs
Clogged by Legal Flotsam from the Decade, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 565 (1997); Roberta
Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 119
(1992); Stout, Takeover Premiums, supra note 21.
35 The heterogeneous expectations approach thus explains not only why bidders pay
premiums, but also why the amount of the premium seems to be directly related to the
percentage of the target's stock the bidder hopes to acquire. See Stout, Takeover Premiums, supra note 21, at 1256 (citing evidence that as bidders seek to acquire larger percentages of targets' stock, they pay larger premiums).
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inevitably must pay a price significantly higher than the market
price for a single share of the target's stock. Far from being peculiar phenomena, large takeover premiums are revealed as the natural consequence of acquiring a large block of shares under
conditions of downward-sloping demand.
MYSTERY

No. 3:

THE NEGLECTED FIRM EFFECT AND SIMILAR
MARKET "ANOMALIES"

A third mystery that has long troubled efficient market theorists is the problem of how to explain empirically observed market
"anomalies," that is, classes of stocks that consistently produce
either higher, or lower, risk-adjusted returns than the market as a
whole. One typical example is the "neglected firm" effect. Studies
have shown that stocks of companies that are relatively unknown
to the public and that do not receive much attention from financial
analysts-so-called neglected firms-tend to trade at depressed
prices relative to better known firms whose names are on every
investor's lips. 36 As a result, a portfolio of relatively cheap ne-

glected stocks will produce superior returns over time compared to
a portfolio of pricier, better known securities.
Scholars who rely on conventional finance theory find this result difficult to explain. After all, the ECMH/CAPM predicts that
in an efficient market, no stock or class of stocks should offer a
bargain relative to any other. The existence of a consistently underpriced class of stocks thus violates one of the most fundamental
tenets of efficient market theory.
Yet the neglected firm effect and a variety of similar market
anomalies make sense under a heterogeneous expectations model
of stock pricing. Consider the example of the neglected firm. The
more obscure a firm is, the smaller the number of people who
know about it. The fewer people who know about a company, the
smaller the pool from which it must draw its subset of relatively
optimistic investors. Thus, where a high profile company known to
a large pool of potential investors may be able to find enough
super-optimists to buy all its shares, a relatively unknown company
that wants to issue the same amount of stock may have to sell to
the merely optimistic as well. The stocks of neglected firms consequently tend to trade at depressed prices relative to the stocks of
better known firms with the same likely risks and returns. Voild36 See James Lindgren, Telling Fortunes: Challenging the Efficient Markets Hypothesis
By Prediction, 1 S. CAL. INTERDiSC. L.J. 7, 17 n.47 (1992) (listing studies).
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the heterogeneous expectations model predicts that neglected
firms should offer a bargain to savvy investors.37
A second kind of company that should offer a bargain is the
boring firm. To understand this point, it is important to recognize
that exciting firms are exciting because their prospects are highly
uncertain (will Netscape come to dominate the market for Internet
search engines, or will it sink into insolvency?). When a firm's future is highly uncertain, the bell curve of investors' subjective expectations is likely to stretch over a wider range. Thus, the
optimistic tail of investors who set market price may be not just
optimistic, but wildly optimistic. Conversely, investors' opinions
about a boring firm will be more uniform, and a market price set
by the most optimistic subset will lie closer to the average investor's valuation. The net result is that boring firms should be underpriced relative to exciting firms.
The above analysis provides a theoretical solution to at least
two more market anomalies: the "low P/E" effect, and the "high
beta" effect.38 Studies have shown that portfolios comprised of
stocks that trade at relatively low price-to-earnings (P/E) ratios
tend to outperform the market portfolio.39 This result makes sense
if low P/E firms tend to be boring firms, and high P/E firms tend to
be exciting firms whose optimistic shareholders expect earnings to
increase dramatically in the near future. Similarly, the heterogeneous expectations approach can explain otherwise-puzzling evidence
that firms with high beta risk--that is, companies whose stocks are
extremely sensitive to nondiversifiable, market-wide fluctuations in
market prices-offer investors lower returns than the market as a
whole.40 This result is a slap in the face of the standard ECMH/
CAPM: after all, one of its most fundamental axioms is that stocks
with high beta risk must offer higher returns to attract risk-averse
37 See Stout, Takeover Premiums, supra note 21, at 1256-57 (discussing heterogeneous
expectations and downward-sloping demand as explanation for neglected firm effect).
38 Yet another market anomaly that can be explained by downward-sloping investor
demand for stocks is the "S&P 500" effect. Studies have shown that when a company's
stock is added to the S&P 500 index, share price tends to rise. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer,
Do Demand Curves for Stocks Slope Down?, 41 J. FIN. 579 (1986). This result is somewhat
puzzling under the conventional ECMH/CAPM, because the S&P 500 list is compiled without regard to the quality of the firms listed. Thus listing should not carry any new information, good or bad, to investors. Index listing does, however, trigger purchases by "indexed"
mutual funds that specialize in holding only S&P 500 securities. If such an increase in the
pool of investors interested in holding a stock shifts a downward-sloping demand function
outward, the net result is to raise market price. See id.
39 See Lindgren, supra note 36, at 16 n.41 (listing studies).
40 See Miller, supra note 25, at 1157, 1167-68 (citing studies).
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investors. 41 Yet the high-beta effect makes sense if high-beta companies are not only risky but exciting (that is, uncertain)
companies.
MYSTERY No. 4: WHY Do CORPORATE MANAGERS BELIEVE
STOCK BUYBACKS AND DIVIDEND PAYOUTS SUPPORT
SHARE PRICES?

Corporate managers often use firm funds to repurchase outstanding stock from shareholders in the belief that such a strategy
will raise, or at least prevent a decline in, the market price of the
firm's stock. Conversely, issuing new shares is thought to depress
market prices. 43 A related belief commonly found in the corporate culture is that regular dividend payments prop up stock
prices. 44 This symmetry reflects the fact that in at least one important respect, buybacks and dividends are equivalent strategies:
both pay out some of the firm's cash either to present shareholders
(in the case of dividends) or to former shareholders (in the case of
buybacks).
To scholars who studied finance in the 1970s and early 1980s,
these beliefs must surely seem somewhat peculiar. According to
the Miller-Modigliani theorem-a close cousin of the ECMH/
CAPM-a firm's decision to pay dividends or repurchase stock
ought to have no effect, positive or negative, on share prices.45
Why then do corporate managers continue to believe
that dividend
46
matter?
programs
repurchase
stock
and
policy
41 See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing relationship between risk and
return under standard CAPM).
42 This observation relies on the crucial distinction between risk and uncertainty. See
generally Stout, Betting The Bank, supra note 21, at 59. Economists use the word "risk" to

refer to situations where the outcome of an event is unknown, but the probabilities of
possible outcomes are known. Thus, a coin toss is risky: while we do not know if the coin
will come up heads or tails, we know the probability of either event is 50%. In contrast,

"uncertainty" exists in situations where neither the outcome nor the probabilities of possible outcomes are fully known, so that individuals' subjective probability estimates may
differ.
43 See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 4, at 345-46 (discussing market participants be-

lieve issuing and repurchasing stock changes price).
44 See William W. Bratton, Dividends, Noncontractibility,and Corporate Law, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 409, 418 (1997).

45 See generally BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 4, at 423-24 (discussing the Miller-

Modigliani theorem and the irrelevance of dividend policy).
46 Substantial empirical evidence supports this view. See, e.g., Laurie Simon Bagwell,
Dutch Auction Repurchases: An Analysis of Shareholder Heterogeneity, 47 J. FIN. 71
(1992).
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In the attempt to resolve this conflict between theory and
practice, some corporate scholars have suggested that regular dividends support share prices because they overcome information
problems by providing distrustful shareholders with evidence of
corporate profits in the form of cold, hard cash, rather than a reported increase in retained earnings in the company's books.4 7
Others argue that dividends and buybacks respond to shareholder
concerns over agency costs by signalling that management is not
indulging in a costly empire-building strategy. 48 Both claims seem
plausible, and both may play some part in explaining why managers believe that buybacks and dividends prop up prices. Yet the
heterogeneous expectations approach offers an alternative and
more straightforward explanation.
When a corporation buys back shares, it reduces the supply of
its stock available on the open market. If the demand curve for the
firm's stock is downward-sloping, the net result is to liquidate the
.interests of the less-optimistic shareholders who comprise the
lower portion of the curve. This naturally and inevitably increases
the marginal price for the company's shares. 49 Similarly, a firm
that pays cash dividends reduces the investment interest of each of
its current shareholders. Because this reduces their firm-specific
risk, it increases their willingness to keep, or even add to, their
shareholdings, again raising the marginal price for shares.
The heterogeneous expectations approach consequently suggests that corporate managers believe that buybacks and dividends
alone raise prices because they do. This result need not depend on
informational asymmetries or shareholder concern over agency
costs: rather, it is the natural and unescapable consequence of restricting the supply of shares in the face of a downward-sloping
demand function.
MYSTERY

No. 5: How Do SOME

INVESTORS AND FUND

MANAGERS CONSISTENTLY BEAT THE MARKET?

The fifth and final mystery I want to discuss is, in a sense, the
principal subject of this conference: how do some fund managers,
Buffett and Munger chief among them, so consistently beat the
market?
47 See Bratton, supra note 44, at 418.
48 See id.

49 See supra note 28 and accompanying text (illustrating relationship between stock
supply and market price under conditions of downward-sloping demand).
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One possible answer is, they really don't. Stocks are naturally
volatile instruments, and random chance ensures that the typical
portfolio manager will enjoy superior returns in some years and
losses in others. A few fortunate managers may even experience a
string of good years-the market's equivalent of flipping a coin ten
times in a row and having it come up heads each time. Perhaps
Berkshire Hathaway's success can be traced to such random luck.
But while the rules of chance admit the possibility of a string
of winners, the longer a winning streak persists, the more statistically unlikely it becomes that credit should be laid at Lady Luck's
door. Studies of the hot hand effect have concluded that some
money managers' winning abilities defy the iron laws of
probability.50 Similarly, Berkshire Hathaway's record of decades
of superior performance is also beginning to look like something
more than mere chance.
Once again, the heterogeneous expectations approach offers a
potential solution to the mystery of Berkshire Hathaway. The heterogeneous expectations approach suggests that Buffett and Munger claim they can beat the market because they can. The reason
can be traced to market anomalies such as the neglected firm effect
examined earlier. If, as the heterogeneous expectations approach
suggests, certain classes of stocks trade at lower prices relative to
their expected risks and returns than other stocks, the clever manager who refuses to accept the conventional wisdom of the ECMH/
CAPM and seeks out such underpriced companies should, over
time, be able beat the market's return. This is exactly what Buffett
and Munger purport to do, and the heterogeneous expectations approach to finance supports their claim.
CONCLUSION: SOME LESSONS FOR CORPORATE SCHOLARS FROM
WARREN BUFFETT

As this brief survey suggests, a model of stock pricing premised on the plausible notions that investors disagree and that the
demand curves for individual stocks are downward-sloping can
solve a number of the puzzles that have long troubled scholars who
rely on the homogeneity-based theories of "modern" finance. Indeed, my discussion has touched upon only a few examples: other
financial mysteries as well can be solved using a heterogeneous expectations approach.51 Rather than providing an exhaustive catalog
of possibilities, however, I would like to close by emphasizing why
50 See studies cited supra note 12.
51 See, e.g., articles cited supra note 21.
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the time has come for corporate scholars to swallow hard and dive
into the sometimes-murky waters of postmodern finance. In brief:
because it works.
During the past two decades, an extensive body of empirical
evidence has accumulated indicating that, in many situations, investors and securities markets simply refuse to behave the way the
ECMH/CAPM predicts they should. Indeed, finance scholars have
found so many exceptions to efficient market behavior that the exceptions appear to be swallowing the rule. Postmodern alternatives to the conventional ECMH/CAPM-including noise theory,
chaos theory, and particularly heterogeneous expectations theory-offer hope to those who want to be able to understand and
predict the markets we've got, rather than the elegant but unrealistically simplistic markets described by Brealey and Myers.
Accordingly, scholars who study financial markets now face a
choice. To those of us who were raised on Brealey and Myers,
postmodern financial theory may seem disconcertingly unfamiliar.
Yet, if postmodern approaches to finance often are more accurate
predictors of actual market behavior, academics who recognize
that reality and incorporate the lessons of postmodern finance into
their work will often be able to produce results that are both positively and normatively more correct than those that can be
achieved using the conventional, homogeneity-based ECMH. To
paraphrase Warren Buffett, we can either hew to the conventional
ECMH/CAPM and be neatly and precisely wrong, or we can heed
the lessons of postmodern finance, and be messily and approxi52
mately right.
As Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger have shown us, a willingness to study financial markets as they actually exist can produce substantial rewards. Although academics' rewards may be
intellectual rather than monetary, they are no less valuable.

See Buffett Essays, supra note 31, at 76 ("[I]t is better to be approximately right than
precisely wrong.").
52

